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Abstract
The preeminent economic challenge for Central European economies in transition is to
grow rapidly for a sustained period of time. On current policies, the Central European
economies can expect to grow at moderate rates, faster than Western Europe, but far short of the
rapid growth rates achieved in the very fast growing economies (VFGEs) in Asia and elsewhere.
This paper discusses the sources of rapid growth in the VFGEs, and the ways in which Central
Europe could emulate key aspects of the economic policies of the VFGEs in order to raise the
growth rates of the Central European economies.
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1. Introduction
The preeminent economic challenge for the Central European economies in transition (hereafter
CEEs) is to grow rapidly for a sustained period of time in order to narrow the economic gap with
Western Europe. There are two important reasons to believe that the gap can be reduced sharply in the
next couple of decades. First, before the Soviet imposition of socialism on the CEEs at end of World
War II, the CEEs had enjoyed per capita income levels comparable to those of many countries of
Western Europe. Czechoslovakia was one of the most prosperous industrial economies of Europe,
while Poland and Hungary had income levels comparable to those of the poorer economies of Western
Europe, such as Greece, Portugal, and Spain. Second, and more generally, economic history shows
that poorer countries that are closely integrated with richer countries tend to grow more rapidly than
the richer countries, thereby tending to narrow the gap in per capita income levels.
Table 1 shows comparison of per-capita income levels of three formerly planned economies in
Central Europe with three Western European economies: Poland and Spain; Hungary and Greece; and
Czechoslovakia and Austria. Five of these economies had roughly similar income levels in 1935. The
sixth, Poland, had an lower income of about 60 percent of the others. As early as 1955, Austria's
income was significantly higher than neighboring Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Between 1955 and
1970, all three Western economies grew faster than their Eastern counterparts. The income gap
widened considerably during the 1970-1990 period, when the Western economies surged in growth
while growth stagnated in the planned economies. By 1992, real per-capita income levels of the central
European economies ranged between 40 and 55 percent of their Western counterparts.
Table 2 compares the 1993 levels of real GDP in the three Central European economies with
14 European Union economies (EUEs), on a purchasing power parity basis. The table shows both
World Bank and Eurostat estimates. The World Bank figures show that the richest of the three, the
Czech Republic, was 47 percent of the average for the European Union, and was 16 percent below the
poorest country of the European Union (EU), Greece. Poland, the poorest of the three CEEs, was a
mere 31 percent of the EU average, and only 55 percent of the Greek level. The Eurostat estimates are
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Table 1. Real GDP Per Capita
1935 1955 1970 1992
Poland 1597 2788 4428 4726
Spain 2792 3995 7291 11711
Ratio: Poland/Spain .57 .70 .61 040
Hungary 2471 2480 5028 5636
Greece 2526 2560 6327 10314
Ratio: Hungary/Greece .98 .97 .79 .55
Czechoslovakia 2410 3922 6460 6845
Austria 2926 5087 9813 17160
Ratio: Czech./Austria .82 .77 .66 040
Source: Maddison, Angus, Monitoring the World Economy 1820-1992 Development Centre of the GECD, 1995.
Table 2. Estimates ofGDP per-capita in Central and Western Europe
GDP per-capita in PPP prices Percent ofEU Average
World Bank Eurostat Index




















United Kingdom 18170 89
EU Average3 17334 86
Czech Republic 7910 44 46 51 53 58
Hungary 6310 31 36 36 48 48
Poland 5380 24 31 28 36 33
The World Bank numbers are taken from World Bank Atlas, 1996. The Eurostat numbers are taken from Eurostat,
Statistics in Focus: Economy and Finance, 1996:4. Estimates of the share of the unofficial economy are taken from
Kaufinann and Kaliberda, Integrating the Unofficial Economy into the dynamics of Post-Socialist Economies, Table
Al page 35. These estimates are 17 percent for the Czech Republic, 29 percent for Hungary and 19 percent for
Poland. We adjust GDP for the unofficial economy by using the formula GDP=(l/(l-a»GDPR, where GDPR is
reported GDP, and a is the share of the unofficial economy. In the EU, the unofficial economy is assumed to be 5
percent. Luxembourg is not included because of missing data.
very close to the World Bank figures. They show the Czech Republic as being slightly richer, and
Poland slightly poorer, than the World Bank data.
Some observers argue that numbers such as these exaggerate the true income gap because of
the greater importance of the unofficial economy in the formerly planned economies. To our
knowledge there is no single study that provides estimates of the importance of the unofficial economy
in both East and West, but we can nevertheless offer some rough estimates. Kaufmann and Kaliberda
(1995) show estimates of the fraction of the unofficial economy in formerly planned economies. They
in turn rely on several further studies' as well as time series statistics on electricity production to bring
all of their estimates up to 1993. According to their estimates, the share of the unofficial economy in
the Czech Republic is estimated to be 17 percent, while Poland is 19 percent, and Hungary at 29
percent. This means that the true GDP in the Czech Republic in 1993 was actually about 1.2 times as
large as reported2 • If we assume further that the unofficial economy in the EU is on average 5 percent,
we arrive at the income ratios shown in the last two columns of Table 2 (note that some observers,
however, put the unofficial economy in Western Europe at much higher levels, comparable to those in
the East). The table shows that the actual ratio of Czech income to that of the EU average would then
be 54 percent rather than the 47 percent reported in Table 2. Similarly, the income ratio for Hungary
would be 50 percent and that for Poland 36 percent. However, even with these adjustments, it is clear
that the income levels in Central Europe are still about half those of the European Union.
Recent cross-country evidence suggests that now that the CEEs have adopted market economies
and open trade with Western Europe, they will experience a strong tendency towards economic
convergence, i.e. towards growth rates consistently in excess of those of the EU, so that the income
gap will tend to narrow over time. The tendency towards convergence has been shown to hold for
economically integrated economies (i.e. those linked by trade and factor movements) in several recent
1 See footnote 25 in Kaufmann and Kaliberda. The estimates for Poland are from RCES and T Helleniak;
those for Hungary are from A. Vertes, and those for the Czech Republic are from T Helleniak.
2 This can be calculated by manipulating the equation .17 =yuJ(yU + yr ), where yU is the unreported gdp
and yr is reported gdp.
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studies, including the U.S. states (Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995), Japanese prefectures (Barro and
Sala-I-Martin, 1995), the regions of Western Europe, the member countries of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Dowrick and Nguyen, 1989), and the subset of the
entire world economy composed of the open trading economies (Sachs and Warner, 1995).
The key economic issue facing the CEEs in the future will probably not be convergence per se,
but rather the speed of convergence. If theCEEs grow only slightly faster than the EU, convergence
will take several decades, a point made by earlier authors (e.g. Baldwin, 1994). To see this, suppose
that per capita income in the EU grows on average at 1 percent per year. Suppose further that Poland
income level today is 36 percent of average income in the EU. If Poland I s per capita income increases
at an average of 3 percent per year, then it would take nearly half a century, 46 years, for Poland to
reach 90 percent of the average per capita income of the EU. On the other hand, if Poland manages to
grow at 5 percent per capita per year, the period until Poland reaches 90 percent of EU per capita
income would be cut in half, to 23 years. The key issue for Poland and the other CEEs therefore is to
achieve high rates of economic growth in the coming decades.
To do this, the CEEs will have to do better in the coming years than the recent performance of
the poorer European Union economies (hereafter PEUEs) -- Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. In
Table 3, we show growth rates for these (and other) economies for the three most recent five-year
periods: 1980-1985, 1985-1990 and 1990-1995. While Portugal, Ireland and Spain each grew rapidly
in the last five years of the 1980s, only Ireland has achieved rapid growth in the 1990s. Greece has
never achieved sustained rapid growth in the past 15 years, and Spain and Portugal grew very slowly in
early 1980s and early 1990s. For the entire fifteen year period 1980-95, all four countries fell short of
5 percent per capita growth. Therefore, instead of being satisfied with the recent growth performance
of the PEUEs, the CEEs should instead try to match the performance of the countries that have a
proven record of rapid growth. We return to the list in Table 3 to identify the fast growing economies,
and in the rest of this paper, we ask what actually distinguishes these economies from other economies.
Turning again to Table 3, we have listed all the countries in the world that grew faster than 4
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Table 3. Growth Rates
Average annual real per-capita GDP growth Reason for
COUNTRY 1980-1985 1986-1990 1990-1995 Population Exclusion
Part A: All countries with growth greater than 4 percent between 1986-1990
KOREA, SOUTH 6.25 9.61 6.54 42380.0 none
SOLOMON IS. -0.11 9.35 2.15 * 360.0* not sustained
GRENADA 9.11 0.51 * 91.0 not sustained
TAIWAN 3.61 8.18 5.87 20101.0 none
PORTUGAL -0.09 8.13 2.24 9883.0 not sustained
ST.KITTS&NEVIS 7.90 4.52 * 40.0* size
THAILAND 2.39 7.81 7.12 55448.0 none
HONG KONG 3.81 7.04 4.51 5686.0 none
MAURITIUS 1.20 6.92 3.47 * 1063.0 not sustained
BELIZE 6.61 2.21* 189.0* not sustained
SINGAPORE 3.15 6.37 6.59 2648.0 none
YEMEN,N 4.08 6.00 10896.0 not a country
BULGARIA 5.87 -6.40 8868.0* not sustained
BARBADOS 5.77 -3.37 254.0* not sustained
MALTA 3.44 5.68 3.96 * 350.0 size
CYPRUS 3.93 5.25 3.04 * 695.0 size
IRELAND 1.21 5.03 4.18 3515.0 none
SOMALIA -0.93 4.97 7566.0 war
SPAIN 0.14 4.93 1.21 38888.0 not sustained
CHILE -3.74 4.64 5.44 12961.0 none
SEYCHELLES -3.24 4.63 2.42 * 67.0 not sustained
MALAYSIA 1.50 4.54 6.32 17353.0 none
TANZANIA -3.46 4.35 -1.39 * 27791.0* not sustained
ETHIOPIA -1.69 4.35 -2.31 * 51070.0* not sustained
LUXEMBOURG 1.99 4.33 4.47 377.0 size
DJIBOUTI 4.28 -1.83 * 390.0* not sustained
FIJI -2.59 4.24 0.85 * 726.0 not sustained
TURKEY 1.41 4.06 0.76 54916.0 not sustained
JAPAN 3.08 4.02 0.93 123116.0 not sustained
Part B. Growth rates of other economies of interest
CHINA
Open coastal provinces 7.70 2.60 13.80
Interior provinces 8.00 2.50 7.60
ITALY 0.85 2.93 1.06 57541
GREECE 0.97 1.71 0.63 10039
The growth rates in the fIrst two columns are from the purchasing-power-adjusted estimates of real GDP, from Penn
World Tables, Summers and Heston (1991) version 5.6. The 1990-1995 growth rates are based on constant local
price GDP data from the IMF's World Economic Outlook database or the World Bank's CDROM data disk, in
which case the growth rates are for 1990-1994 (Source: World Data 1995, March 1996). The World Bank Data is
indicated with an asterisk next to the number. The population data are either 1989 estimates fromPenn World
Tables, version 5.6, or as indicated by an asterisk, 1992 estimates from the 1994 World Almanac. Growth rates for
China are from the regional data set developed by Jian, Sachs and Warner (forthcoming, 1996).
percent for the period 1985-1990, and then have included the growth in the two neighboring 5-year
periods, 1980-1985 and 1990-1995. If we ask which countries grew faster than 4 percent per year for
each of the two five-year periods 1985-1990 and 1990-1995, the list includes 10 countries: Korea,
Taiwan, St. Kitts and Nevis, Thailand, Hong Kong, Singapore, Ireland, Chile, Malaysia and
Luxembourg. If we lower the threshold to 3 percent growth, the list would also include Mauritius,
Malta and Cyprus. St Kitts and Nevis, Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg are quite small, with
populations of less than a million, and therefore do not seem to be ideal models for the Central
European countries. Therefore, our list of the very fastest growing countries (hereafter VFGEs) in the
world in the past decade includes the remaining nine countries. These fast-growing economies share
important characteristics of economic strategy which underlie their superior growth performance. They
therefore highlight important policy directions for the CEEs as they aim to achieve very rapid growth
in the coming decades.
This paper describes ways that the CEEs can speed their convergence with the EU by
emulating the growth strategies of the very fast growing economies. In Section II, we discuss some of
the sources of their superior growth performance. In Section III, we demonstrate the role of key policy
variables in the context of cross-country growth equations. In Section IV, we examine how the CEEs
can emulate key aspects of the economic policies of the VFGEs, in order to raise their growth in the
coming years.
II. Sources of Growth in the VFGEs
We define the VFGEs as all middle-income developing countries with populations in 1989 of
more than 1 million that achieved a per capita growth rate of 4 percent per annum or higher during the
two periods 1985-90 and 1990-94. There are eight countries that meet this standard: Chile, Hong
Kong, Malaysia, Mauritius, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. Ireland also meets this
standard but we classify Ireland among the European Union economies rather than the developing
economies. Of course, there is no universally accepted interpretation of the striking successes of the
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VFGEs, and especially of the East Asian countries that form the bulk of the group, whose growth
performance has been most studied and debated. Our own interpretations of the outstanding VFGE
success is based on four clusters of factors.
The first cluster involves allocative efficiency, that is the efficiency with which resources are
allocated among the various sectors of the economy at a point in time. In our interpretation, allocative
efficiency is especially high in the VFGEs because these economies have relied mainly on market
forces in the allocation ofresources, and have kept government intervention to relatively low levels.
These countries evidence a high degree of market competition, built upon a low degree of government
intervention in the economy, a high degree of openness of the economy to international trade,
flexibility of labor markets, and generally low levels of taxation, especially of labor income.
The second cluster involves the promotion of high rates of saving and investment. The
VFGEs have achieved rates of saving and investment as a percent of GDP that are far in excess of the
averages for other economies at similar income levels. These high saving and investment rates are the
result of a combination of high rates of government saving and investment, high rates of private saving,
and high rates of foreign direct investment (FDI) from abroad. In turn, the high private savings and
FDI seem to be related mainly to a combination of demographic characteristics, national pension
(retirement) policy, and overall fiscal and regulatory policies described below.
The third cluster involv~s technological upgrading, that is the ability of national economies to
absorb new technologies from abroad and to adapt them in domestic production. None of the VFGEs
is a major innovator in technology, but all have been effective in utilizing world-class technologies for
purposes of upgrading domestic production. Technological efficiency seems to be achieved by a
combination of attraction of foreign technologies (through foreign direct investment and licensing),
infrastructure spending, and education policy.
The fourth cluster involves favorable structural endowments of the VFGEs, related to their
resource base and geographical characteristics. The VFGEs enjoy some favorable structural conditions
which have supported their high rates of growth. Fortunately, the eEEs share these key
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characteristics. Both the VFGEs and the CEEs are relatively poor in natural resources; perhaps
somewhat paradoxically, a scarcity of natural resources have been an advantage to economies seeking
to establish export-led growth in manufactures. Also, the VFGEs are blessed with good access to
international shipping. The CEEs, similarly, enjoy low transport costs to the markets of Western
Europe.
We now turn to these four clusters of characteristics, to show in some detail the unusual
characteristics of the VFGEs. In the next section, we then demonstrate that these characteristics are
related to high rates of economic growth, in the context of cross-country econometric growth
equations.
Allocative Efficiency
A convenient starting point for assessing the allocative efficiency of the VFGEs is the Index of
Economic Freedom (henceforth IEF) first created by the Heritage Foundation in 1995, and updated in
1996 (see Johnson and Sheehey, 1996). The IEF aims to measure, on a consistent cross-country basis,
the extent of market distortions in 140 economies. The index focusses on two main kinds of
distortions: (1) market distortions caused by government intervention (e.g. through taxation, wage and
price controls, trade barriers); and (2) the absence of well-defined property rights (e.g. through
government corruption, arbitrary government confiscation of property, high levels of black market
activity). The IEF is constructed from ten sub-indexes, measuring market distortions resulting from:
protectionist trade policy; taxation; government consumption expenditure, monetary policy (inflation),
restrictions on capital flows and foreign investment, restrictions on banking, wage and price controls,
the absence of secure property rights, interventionist regulatory policy, and black market activity. For
each category, a sub-index is created which runs from 1 (the lowest level of distortion) to 5 (the highest
level of market distortion). The overall index is a simple arithmetic average of the 10 sub-indexes.
In Table 4, we present the sub-indexes and overall IEF for several sub-groups of countries.
The first sub-group is the VFGEs, which is the focus of our immediate attention. The second sub-
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Table 4. Data from the 1996 Index of Economic Freedom
Trade Taxation Gov. Mon. Foreign Banking Wage/ Property Regu- Black
Cons. Policy Inv. Prices Rights lation Market
Very Fast Growing Economies
2.2 2.8 1.4 1.6 2.3 2.4 2.3 1.1 2.0 1.7
Slow Growing Economies
3.3 3.9 2.0 5.0 2.3 2.8 3.0 2.5 3.0 3.5
Rest ofthe Developing Economies
4.2 3.7 2.7 2.9 2.8 3.2 2.9 3.1 3.6 3.9
Poor European Union Economies
2.0 4.5 2.5 2.0 2.0 3.0 2.5 1.8 2.8 2.8
Other European Union Economies
2.1 4.5 2.6 1.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 1.3 2.6 1.0
Central European Economies
3.0 3.8 2.7 3.7 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.0 2.3 2.7
Trade: Based on average tariffs (ranges from 1 « 4 %) to 5 (> 20 %)).
Taxation: Based on income and corporate taxes (from 1 (low) to 5).
Government Consumption: Based on ratio of government consumption to GDP (1 « 10%) 5 (>46 %)).
Monetary Policy: Based on average inflation rate (1 «6% 5 (>30%)).
Foreign Investment: 1 (encourages foreign investment 5 (actively prevents foreign investment).
Banking: 1 (few restrictions) 4 (banks tightly controlled) 5 (fmancial institutions in chaos).
Wages/Prices: 1 (no wage/price controls) 5 (complete control).
Property Rights: Protection of property rights: 1 (very high) 5 (nonexistent).
Regulation: 1 (clear, uniformly applied, no corruption) 5 (unclear, randomly applied, bribes mandatory)
Black Market: 1 (black market is less than 10 % of GDP) 5 (> 30%).
group is four prominent slow-growing economies (SGEs) among the middle income nations: Argentina,
Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey. This group provides a useful contrast to the VFGEs among developing
countries. Our third sub-group for comparison includes all developing countries other than the VFGEs
(henceforth RDEs, signifying the rest of the developing economies). The fourth comparator group is
the four poorest European Union economies, the PEUEs. The fifth comparator group is the European
Union. The sixth and final comparator group is the three CEEs themselves, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland.
As we see from the Table, for almost all sub-categories vis-a-vis almost all comparator groups,
the VFGEs display a relatively low level of market distortions. We can summarize these findings along
three broad dimensions: openness to trade, size of government spending and taxation, and distortions of
property rights caused by government intervention or lack of legal enforcement. First, we see that the
VFGEs are much more open to trade than the average developing country (and about the same as the
PEUEs, the post-1989 CEEs, and EVEs). Second, the VFGEs have small governments, as measured
by tax rates, the level of government consumption as a percent of GDP, and the restrictive monetary
policy (measured by the inflation rate over the past decade). Third, these economies have a low extent
of regulation (e.g. the absence of price controls and the restriction of entry of new banks), combined
with a strong enforcement of property rights, and the absence of black markets. The combination of
low taxes, open trade, and relatively low levels of market regulation is, in fact, probably the main
cause of the low level of black market activity, since black markets thrive precisely at points where
governments distort market-based exchange, through regulations, taxation, or other restrictions on
international and domestic trade.
The IEF offers us useful comparative summary measures of the main aspects of market
distortions. To understand the particular policies of the VFGEs, however, it is important to look in
more detail at the three main aspects of government intervention in the economy: restrictions on
international trade, the size of government, the regulatory regime. A closer look supports the view that
the VFGEs are characterized by small government and a strong reliance on market forces. It also helps
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to allay suspicions that the IEF values are ex post market-based rationalizations of the superior growth
performance of these countries. (This concern naturally arises from the fact that only the first four sub-
indexes, for trade, taxation, government consumption, and monetary policy, are based on objective
quantitative indicators, while the remaining six criteria are based on non-quantitative indicators and the
judgments of the authors of the report).
The issue of trade policy has been examined in depth in Sachs and Warner (1995a). This
earlier study demonstrated that protectionism was the rule, rather than the exception, among developing
countries during the decades of the 1960s-1980s. Only a handful of developing countries bucked the
general trend towards protectionism, by keeping markets open to world trade. For purposes of that
study, openness was defined as the absence of strong protectionist policies in any of four dimensions of
trade policy: tariffs; quotas and licensing; inconvertibility of the currency; and export taxation. If a
country was protectionist in at least one of the four dimensions in a particular period, it was judged to
be protectionist overall during the period in question. The VFGEs are all characterized by a very early
date of trade liberalization in the post-war era. In fact, it is in the duration rather than the purity of
open trade policies that these countries most stand out from their counterparts in the developing world.
According to our earlier assessments, shown in Table 5, five of the eight VFGEs have always
maintained open trade policies: Hong Kong, Malaysia, Mauritius, Singapore, and Thailand. The three
others opened very early by the standards of the developing world: Taiwan in 1963, Korea in 1968,
and Chile in 1976 (these dates signify the first year in which the country meets the threshold conditions
for openness as defined in the paper). Today, after more than a decade of trade liberalization
throughout the developing world, these countries no longer stand out as much as they used to on
indicators such as average tariff rates (see Table 5 for examples).
The VFGEs are also notable, in comparison with most other countries, both developing and
developed, in the limited size of the state in the economy, as measured by government spending and
taxation. In Table 6, we show recent government expenditure ratios, and the division between
consumption spending and investment spending, for the VFGEs and four other sub-groups: the SGEs,
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"This is based on the criteria for openness in Sachs and Warner (1995), "Economic Reform and the Process of
Global Integration", Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1995:1, Brookings Institution: Washington, DC. For
the Central European countries we use information from Transition Report 1995, EBRD.
b Average tariffs are taken from Johnson and Sheehy, 1996 Index of Economic Freedom.
Table 6. Level of Government Spending, and its Distribution Between Consumption and Investment
Government Spending (percent ofGDP, 1995)1 Production of
--------------------------------------------------------------- State-owned
Total Consumption Investment Enterprises 2
(percent of GDP)
Very Fast Growing Economies
Chile 20.8 24.0 4.1 12.9
Hong Kong 16.6 11.4 5.2 n.a.
Korea S. 20.3 11.6 8.7 10.3
Malaysia 30.6 14.1 16.5 17.0
Mauritius 23.8 20.0 3.8 1.8
Singapore 20.4 14.1 6.3 n.a.
Taiwan 25.7 22.5 3.2 6.2
Thailand 22.1 12.3 9.8 5.4
Slow Growing Economies
Argentina 18.1 16.4 1.7 4.7
Brazil 37.5 37.0 0.5 8.6
Mexico 33.5 30.0 3.5 11.0
Turkey 26.3 24.7 1.6 9.1
Poor European Union Economies
Greece 54.0 49.7 4.3 n.a.
Ireland 45.1 43.9 1.2 n.a.
Portugal 47.3 44.8 2.5 14.2
Spain 46.0 43.1 2.9 n.a.
Central European Economies
Czech Republic 50.9 46.6 4.3 30.0 (1994)
Poland 49.4 47.3 2.1 40.0 (1994)
Hungary 54.6 53.0 1.5 40.0 (1994)
I Government spending data is taken either from the Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, IMF, or from the
World Economic Outlook database at the IMF. The figures are for general government (federal and local) except
for Argentina, Hong Kong, Korea and Singapore, where it is for the central government.
2 For the Central European countries, source is Transition Report 1995, and numbers are for the latest available year.
For other countries, the source is World Bank (1995) Bureaucrats in Business, Table A. 1., the numbers are for
1985-91.
the PEUEs, the EU, and the CEEs. We see that the VFGEs have the lowest levels of government
consumption spending and overall current government spending among these groups. The EU
countries and the CEEs are on very high end, reflecting the extensive social welfare spending within
Western Europe and Central Europe. The VFGEs also spend a greater share on investment rather than
consumption.
In Table 7 we show a fmer breakdown of the composition of government spending across
countries. The data are reported by 13 expenditure categories, and follow the consistent methodology
of the Government Finance Statistics of the IMF. The data are given for a selected list of countries
where the data are available and cover the latest available year in the 1990's. The data show that much
of the cross country variation in government spending comes from two spending items: social security
and welfare (in which old-age pensions are an important sub-category) and interest payments on
government debt. After taking out these items, the two VFGEs in this sample, Singapore and
Malaysia, have spending ratios that are much more similar to the rest of the world. The table also
shows that the spending ratios of the three central European countries are among the highest in the
world, even after excluding social payments.
One crucial consequence of high levels of government expenditure as a percent of GDP is the
distortionary effects of the taxes levied to pay for the government spending. The VFGEs greatly limit
the distortionary effects of taxat~onby keeping overall government expenditure under control. To
measure the extent of the tax distortions, it is important, though very difficult, to examine the incentive
effects of the overall tax system, not just particular tax rates. To do this precisely, we would need to
know the marginal tax rates for the entire range of taxes in the economy, and presumable for various
income groups (which would tend to face different marginal tax rates). We would also need a model of
tax incidence in order to assess the general-equilibrium effects of the tax system. As a much simpler
and cruder expedient here, we calculate one measure of the burden of labor-income taxation, by
calculating the tax wedge between the cost of labor to the enterprise and the real take-home pay of a
worker of average income.
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Table 7. General United Czech
Government Spending, Singapore Malaysia States Mexico Brazil Spain France Greece Gennany Holland Rep. Hungary Poland
-, percent ofGOP 1993 1993 1993 1990 1992 1992 1990 1993 1991 1994 ' 1994 1994 1994
1 general public services 2.10 2.71 2.02 0.95 4.50 1.15 3.65 3.44 3.92 4.34 3.88
2 defense 5.04 3.24 3.38 0.78 0.87 1.62 2.89 4.81 2.00 1.74 2.53
3 public order and safety 0.80 1.60 1.17 0.15 0:64 1.57 0.86 1.28 1.32 1.69 2.66
4 education 5.04 5.59 5.81 4.60 1.21 2.03 4.98 4.59 3.60 5.55 5.63 6.00 4.90
5 health 1.22 1.57 5.45 0.63 1.74 2.87 7.45 4.01 7.25 6.61 7.29 6.80 4.50
6 social security and welfare 0.78 1.61 7.11 4.11 9.88 17.94 21.54 7.24 18.12 19.60 . 12.42 9.90 15.00
7 housing and community arne 1.42 1.52 0.69 0.20 0.17 0.23 2.56 0.69 2.13 4.61 3.72
8 reer. relig. & cult. affairs 0.09 0.00 0.29 0.10 0.02 0.23 1.03 0.36 0.85 1.02 0.99
9 subsidies to industry 0.08 1.60 0.56 2.14 0;69 0.76 0.51 0.00 1.40 0.68 2.70 4.40 2.00'
12 transport and communicatil 0.51 2.27 1.52 0.65 1.71 1.94 1.34 1.81 2.36 2.36 3.49
13 other economic affairs 1.74 1.23 0.38 1.64 0.10 1.05 0.97 0.54 1.68 0.77 1.22
14 interest payments 1.53 5.17 4.60 14.80 15.98 4.39 2.76 15.86 2.58 5.59 1.84
15 other expenditures 0.00 2.53 -0.51 2.73 0.00 10.16 3.75 6.58 3.52 2.84 2.53
Total 20.36 30.64 32.47 33.49 37.50 45.96 54.72 53.96 50.73 57.40 50.90 61.60 49.30
Total excluding 6 19.58 29.03 25.35 29.38 27.63 28.01 32.76 ' 43.97 32.61 37.80 38.49 51.70 34.30
Total excluding 6 and 14 18.05 23.86 20.75 14.58 11.64 23.62 29.99 28.11 30.04 32.21 36.65
Sources: hltemational Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, 1995.
Barbone, L., and Hana Polackova, Public Finances and Economic Transition, World Bank, PRP No. 1585, March 1996. (for Hungary and Poland)
Line 14, Interest payments, are for the central government, and line 6, for Hungary and Poland, includes only perision payments.
In our calculation, the tax wedge has four components: the payroll tax paid by the firm; the
payroll tax paid by the worker; the personal income tax; and the value added tax (which raises the price
of goods to the final consumer). Suppose that the pre-tax price level is P, and the pre-tax wage level is
W. The nominal take-home pay of workers is W(l-"t"y)(l-"t"pw), where "t"y is the marginal rate of
income taxation, and "t"pw is the payroll tax paid by the worker. Since P is the pre-tax price level, the
consumer price level is P(l +w), where W is the rate of consumer taxation (or VAT taxation). The
real-take home pay is therefore given by W(I-"t"y)(1-"t"pw)/P(1 +w). The cost of labor to the firm,
deflated by the price level P, is W(l +"t"pt)/P, where "t"pf is the rate of payroll tax paid by the firm.
Now, if taxes are such that the firm pays twice the wage that the worker actually receives, we say that
the tax wedge is 100 percent, since the cost of labor to the firm is 100 percent above the real take home
pay of the employee. Specifically, we define the tax wedge as IOO*«cost-of-labor)/(real-take-home-
pay)-l). We can see directly that this tax wedge is given by:
(6) "t"w [«(1 +"t"pt)(l +W)/(1-"t"y)(I-"t"pw))-I]*100
In the final column in Table 8, we show the calculation of the tax wedge for four subgroups of
economies: the VFGEs, SGEs, PEDEs, and the ED-8. The VFGEs have, by far, the lowest tax
wedges, suggesting the lowest levels of tax distortions in the labor market. Note in particular that the
VFGEs rely very little, if at all, on payroll taxation, in sharp distinction to the European economies
(including the EUEs, the PEUEs, and the CEEs). This low reliance on payroll taxation is mainly a
consequence of the distinctive character of the pension systems in the VFGEs, a point to which we
return later in our discussion of national saving rates.
The low rates of the labor tax wedge in the VFGEs have two main consequences. First, there
is a powerful incentive to operate in the legal market rather than in the black market, since the gains to
tax evasion are relatively small. We have already seen evidence that black market activity is relatively
low in the VFGEs, at least as measured by the sub-index of the IEF. Second, there is the incentive for
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Table 8. Tax Policy as of 1994
Income Corporate Social Value
Tax Rate of the Income Security Added Tax
Average Persona Tax Rateb Tax RateC Tax Rated Wedgee
Very Fast Growing Economies
Chile 5.0 (%) 35.0 9.0 18.0 35.7
Hong Kong 2.0 17.0 0.0 0.0 2.0
South Korea 9.0 35.0 8.0 10.0 31.4
Malaysia 10.0 40.0 23.0 10.0 53.8
Mauritius n.a. n.a. 9.0 n.a. n.a.
Singapore 15.0 27.0 0.0 1.02 18.8
Taiwan 6.0 25.0 6.03 5.0 18.9
Thailand 5.0 30.0 5.0 7.0 18.4
Slow Growing Economies
Argentina 21.0 40.0 46.0 18.0 130.4
Brazil 25.0 48.0 35.0 16.0 114.7
Mexico 17.0 34.0 20.0 10.0 59.8
Turkey 30.0 27.0 33.0 15.0 128.3
Poor European Union Economies
Greece 5.0 40.0 36.0 18.0 74.8
Ireland 27.0 50.0 20.0 21.0 101.6
Portugal 16.0 40.0 38.0 16.0 96.2
Spain 25.0 35.0 38.0 15.0 114.6
Central European Economies
Czech Republic 20.0 41.0 42.0 23.04 128.5
Poland 21.0 40.0 48.0 22.05 128.5
Hungary 35.0 36.0 61.06 25.0 223.8
Notes:
aThe marginal income tax rate of the tax bracket that contains the average per-capita GNP.
b Typically there is only one rate. If not, this is the maximum rate.
C Sum of employer's and employee's payroll tax rates to fund benefits such as unemployment, health care,
occupational insurance, and pensions.
dThe reported rate is the rate that covers most goods and services. Some countries have special rates for luxuries
and imports. In countries without value added taxes, this is the sales tax rate.
e Cost of labor to the firm as a percentage of real take home pay of the average wage worker:
= 100*«(1+sstf)(1 +vat)/(1-inctax)(1-sstw)-l)
1 Approximate employer contribution rate for disability insurance for low-wage employees.
2 Does not include 4% tax on food and beverages.
3 Does not include additional occupational risk insurance required in special industries.
4 VAT on food and energy is 5%.
5 VAT on food, construction and some pharmaceuticals is 7%.
6 Includes employer contributions to the social security fund (44%), unemployment fund (7%), and vocational fund
(1.5%) and employee contribution to the social security fund (10%).
Source: 1995 International Tax Summaries, Coopers and Lybrand.
high rates of labor market participation, assuming realistically that the elasticity of labor participation
with respect to the post-tax wage is positive. In the other countries, by contrast, the high tax wedges
will discourage labor-market participation, through a variety of channels: more frequent spells of
unemployment, reductions of average hours at work per month, temporary withdrawals from the labor
force, and early permanent retirement. It is surely no accident that unemployment rates in the VFGEs
are negligible, while they often stand at double-digit rates in the SGEs and the EU economies.
Similarly, average working hours per month are much higher in the VFGEs than in the SGEs, though
per capita income levels are comparable.
The IEF underscores not only the relative openness and small size of government in the
VFGEs, but also the relative security of property rights, the operation of the rule oflaw, and the low
levels of market distortions through government regulations and wage and price controls. These
dimensions of government policy are difficult to measure, so the rankings of the IEF should be viewed
as provisional only. Nonetheless, we can fmd independent supporting evidence on each dimension.
One good indicator of weak property rights is the propensity of governments to confiscate
private property, perhaps most visibly in the form of nationalizations of enterprises. During 1960-
1980, U.S. foreign investors experienced a total of 327 instances of nationalizations in a total of 67
developing countries. While most developing countries engaged in at least some nationalizations, there
was, remarkably, not one singl~ instance ofnationalizations in seven of the eight VFGEs: Hong Kong,
Korea, Malaysia, Mauritius, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. Only Chile among the VFGEs
undertook any nationalizations, and most of these nationalization were concentrated in the Allende
Regime, 1970-1973. There were no nationalizations after the Pinochet coup of 1973. Interestingly,
virtually every developing country that engaged in nationalizations in the period 1960-80 ended up in
severe macroeconomic crises in the 1980s, usually crises of very high inflation and non-payments on
foreign debts. The linkage between nationalizations and subsequent macroeconomic crises is not
direct, but both phenomena are probably symptoms of "overactive" governments that attempted to
implement state-led industrialization policies, and ended up in fmancial bankruptcy as a result.
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As for further evidence on the rule of law, we can draw upon an index of the Rule of Law
(ROL) used by Knack and Keefer (1995), and by Barro (1995). The ROL is an index based on survey
data to measure the extent "to which the citizens of country are willing to accept the established
institutions to make and implement laws and adjudicate disputes." Higher values of the index signify
"sound political institutions, a strong court system, and provisions for an orderly succession of power. "
Lower values mean that there is a "tradition of depending on physical force or illegal means to settle
claims." The range is 0-6. The variable is for the year 1982. The VFGEs indeed show a much higher
value of ROL than the average for the rest of the developing countries, 4.7 compared with 1.8. On
average, the VFGEs are at about the same level as the PEDEs, which have an average value of 4.8,
and slightly below the ED average of 5.6. We will use the ROL index in our cross-country regression
estimates in the next section.
Finally, we turn to market distortions caused by government regulations and wage and price
controls. One area of particular importance is labor-market regulation. While most of the VFGEs
have active trade union sectors, the framework of labor law in these countries is very market oriented,
with few government-imposed standards on the freedom of hire and fire, prior notification of layoffs,
severance payments, and minimum wage. Wage negotiations take place at the enterprise level, rather
than at the industry or regional level as in more corporatist settings. The terms of the contractual labor
relationship is left mainly to ent~rprises and workers themselves. In Hong Kong, for example, firms
have the freedom under law to layoff workers with only one week's notice (or subject to the terms of
collective bargaining agreements freely negotiated between the enterprise and unions). Similar freedom
to adjust the labor force is found in the labor legislation governing Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand.
As an illuminating contrast, consider Spain's labor laws. The labor legislation puts enormous
obstacles in the way of enterprise layoff decisions (see IMF, 1995a). As a general principle, workers
kept beyond a short trial period (2-6 months) are considered permanent, and are thereafter entitled to
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generous severance payments and judicial appeals in the event of layoffs.3 Collective dismissals
required government approval via an Employment Regulation Procedure (ERP) with the Ministry of
Labor. As the IMF notes (p. 45): "Businessmen and economists who study the Spanish labor market
are virtually unanimous in the opinion that these high dismissal costs act as a major deterrent to the
creation of permanent jobs, and thus have been a contributing factor to the high Spanish
unemployment." Recent labor law reforms have somewhat reduced the burdens of these regulations.
Labor legislation, in addition, has "maintained tight controls on geographical mobility, the length of the
working day, number of permissible overtime hours, minimum vacation time, and other features of the
employment relationship." (p. 30)
Many other developing countries, such as the slow-growing Latin American countries, have
maintained similar restrictions on hiring, firing, and working conditions. Argentina has had long
mandatory notification periods for layoffs, as well as collective bargaining agreements backed by labor
legislation which has given enormous power to union members vis-a-vis the unemployed and new
entrants to the labor force. For example, Argentina's 1975 labor legislation enshrined the principle of
"ultra-actividad," according to which a collective agreement remained in force even after expiration,
until a new agreement was reached between the unions and the employers, thereby giving enormous
power to the unions in negotiation. (For further details, see IMF, 1995b, p. 49).
The overall image of the VFGEs as open economies, with small government sectors, and with a
very light degree of government regulation, may surprise some readers. One popular interpretation of
the East Asian experience is that strong, autonomous "developmental states" have led the
industrialization process through detailed industrial policies and strong government intervention.
Amsden (1994) has argued, for example, that the East Asian economies have deliberately "gotten the
prices wrong" as part of a government-led industrial policy that has worked against market forces.
3In Spain in 1994, the average severance payment was for approximately 50 weeks of work, or about 260 days
(IMF, 1995a, p. 13a). In Malaysia, by contrast, the severance payment by law is 10 days for each year of
employment for total employment under 2 years; 15 days for each year of employment for total employment
between 2 and 5 years; and 20 days for each year of employment for total employment above 5 years.
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Wade (1992) has made a similar, widely noted analysis in the cases of Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.
These authors are correct that most of East Asia has not abided by textbook laissez faire policies
(though Hong Kong comes rather close, and Singapore, like Hong Kong, has almost completely free
international trade). But these authors compare East Asia with pure textbook laissezfaire, instead of
with the rest of the developing world. On an international comparative standard, the East Asian
economies stand out as highly market oriented, with a long period of relatively free trade, low levels of
government spending relative to GDP, and limited distortions from government regulations.
Moreover, the view of East Asia as strongly influenced by industrial policies was arguably correct for
Japan until the mid-1960s and for Korea until around 1979, but it is much less true for these countries
in recent years. Moreover, it has never been particularly true for Taiwan since the early 1960s, and is
even less true for the very fast growing Southeast Asian countries during their entire rapid growth era
from the mid-1960s. All of these other countries have had consistently smaller roles for industrial
policy than in Japan and Korea. Moreover, as we shall note later on, there is little evidence in the
cases of Korea and Japan that the industrial policies contributed to accelerated economic growth.
The promotion of high national saving and investment rates
One of the distinguishing characteristics of the VFGEs is the very high rates of national saving
and investment achieved in these economies, as shown in Tables 9 and 10. Many studies have
demonstrated that countries with higher rates of saving and investment achieve higher rates of overall
growth, so the high rates of saving and investment surely merit our careful attention. We surmise that
the overall macroeconomic stability, moderate tax rates, and rule oflaw, in the VFGEs, all contribute
to the high rates of saving and investment. But equally important, in our view, are other channels
through which fiscal policy promotes high rates of saving and investment in these economies.
Most importantly, the VFGEs tend to achieve high rates of government saving, i.e. an excess
of current government revenues over current government expenditures, as we show in Table 10. This
government saving is used partly to achieve an overall budget surplus, and partly to finance a relatively
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1 Average annual growth in real gross domestic product per person for the period 1985-1992, unless otherwise
specified. The source is the real GDP data (adjusted for purchasing power) in version 5.6 of the Penn World Tables,
which is an update of the data in Summers and Heston (1991).
2The economically-active population is defmed as the population between ages 15 and 64. The figures in column 2
equal those in column 1 minus the average annual growth in the ratio of the economically active population to total
population, between the years 1985 and 1990. The demographic data is from World Tables, 1994, data diskette.
3 Defmed as (GDP-C-G)/GDP. Source is the data assembled for the 1995 World Economic Outlook, International
Monetary Fund.
4 Ratio of nominal gross fixed capital formation to nominal gross domestic product. Source is the data assembled
for the 1995 World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund.
5From Penn World Tables. version 5.6 (See Summers and Heston, 1991). The figures for the Central European
countries are estimates based on Summers and Heston data and data from the World Development Report, various
issues.
6 For the Central European countries, growth rates are taken from Transition Report 1995, European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, annex 1.1 and table 3.1, pages 185 and 68. Population growth is taken from the
Penn World Tables, version 5.6.
7The growth data are taken from OECD Economic Outlook, June 1995. Growth in labor force participation rates is
from p. A22; GDP growth is from p. A4.
Table 10. Government Saving and Private Saving
National Government Private
Saving Saving Saving
(% ofGDP) (%ofGDP) (% ofGDP)
1995 1995 1995
Very Fast Growing Economies
Chile 28.2 (%) 6.9 (%) 21.3
Hong Kong 33.9 5.3 28.5
Korea S. 36.1 9.2 26.9
Malaysia 32.4 13.0 19.4
Mauritius 24.8 3.9 20.9
Singapore 49.4 19.1 30.3
Taiwan 28.1 2.7 25.4
Thailand 33.1 12.3 20.7
Slow Growing Economies
Argentina 17.6 0.3 17.3
Brazil 19.1 -0.6 19.7
Mexico 16.9 5.2 11.7
Turkey 23.8 -2.7 26.5
Poor European Union Economies
Greece 20.6 -5.9 26.5
Ireland 21.7 -0.5 22.1
Portugal 24.4 -1.6 26.0
Spain 22.2 -1.8 24.1
Central European Economies
Czech Republic 21.2 6.2" 15.0
Poland 18.8 -0.6 19.4
Hungary 17.1 -2.1 19.2
Notes:
National saving is defmed as (GDP-C-G)/GDP, government saving is government revenue minus current
government expenditure, and private saving is the national saving minus government saving. The source is the data
assembled for the 1995 World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund.
high rate of public investment spending as a proportion of GDP. Since national saving is the sum of
public saving plus private saving, the high public saving rate contributes to a high overall national
saving rate, unless the high government saving "crowds out" an equal rate of private saving. While it
is theoretically possible that lower private saving would offset high public saving on a one-for-one
basis, extensive cross-country evidence suggests that such a tradeoff between public and private saving,
when it exists, is much less than one for one. (For recent international evidence, see Edwards, 1995,
and our estimates in Table 13).
The high rates of government saving are associated with high rates of government investment
spending. While the VFGEs restrict their current spending as a percentage of GDP, they certainly
engage in considerable infrastructure investment in energy, communications, and transport, often in
support of international trade activities. The relatively high rates of government investment were
shown in Table 6.
Another important contribution of fiscal policy in the VFGEs is to raise private saving rates via
the organization of the national retirement system. While the European economies tend to rely on pay-
as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems, with nearly universal coverage, most of the VFGEs have either
small state-run pension systems, e.g. covering only government employees, or state-regulated systems
that depend on individualized savings plans rather than PAYG financing. The most important
distinction between various reti~ement systems is the link between an individual's saving for retirement
and the individual's eventual benefits at the time of retirement. In the PAYG systems, retirement
benefits tend to be only loosely related to an individual's preceding payroll tax payments. In
individualized systems, by contrast, an individual's retirement benefits depend directly on the
accumulation of the individual's own personal savings.
A comparison of old-age pension data is shown in Table 11. We present three different
indicators. In the first column we see that the VFGEs have a lower proportion of elderly people than
the economies in western and central Europe. Partly as a result of this, we see in the second column








































































I For 1990. Source is table A.l, page 343, in Averting the Old Age Crisis, World Bank (1994).
2 Source is table A.5. in the same publication, page 358. The years range from 1985 to 1992.
3 These are the authors estimates based on data in Social Security Programs Throughout the World, 1995, U.S.
Social Security Administration. We estimate how much annual income an average person can expect to receive
from the various state-provided pensions, without any saving effort of his own, and divide by per-capita GDP (for
1995). Calculations are based on the main pension system in operation between 1990-1995. The figures are
reported in percent, so a value of 100 means that the estimated value of the state-provided pension benefits was
equal to per-capita GDP.
also have an important difference in pension policy from other countries. Chile, Malaysia, and
Singapore, have instituted a retirement system based on individualized savings accounts. Another four
countries, Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, and Mauritius, have pay-as-you-go systems, but with very low
rates of taxation and benefits. Korea's system began only in the 1990s. Thailand still does not have a
state-run system, either pay-as-you-go or individualized, though a pay-as-you-go system is scheduled to
be introduced in 1996. By contrast, all of the European economies shown in the table operate on a
pay-as-you-go system, with much higher rates of taxation and benefits.
To compare pension policy across countries on a common yardstick, we report in the third
column of Table 11 our own estimates of the annual value of the state-provided pension benefits as a
percentage of each country's average per-capita GDP. For each country, we calculate what a person
with the average retirement age and average life expectancy can expect to receive from the state
pension system during each year of retirement, without drawing on any personal savings. In provident
fund systems where all retirement income comes from the cumulation of previous private saving, this
figure is of course o. In pension systems that give the worker a lump sum at retirement, we divide this
lump sum by the likely duration of retirement, to estimate annual benefits, and then divide this by per-
capita GDP. In pension systems which offer the retiree a fixed fraction of his income during his latest
working years, we assume that the average worker can qualify for the pension and often use this
fraction directly (this is reasonable because the conditions are usually easy to satisfy). For example, in
Brazil, a pensioner can receive 70 percent of average annual earnings in the last 36 months of his
working life, plus 1 percent of average earnings for each year of contribution, up to a maximum of 100
percent of average earnings. So for Brazil we have estimated the value of the state pension benefits to
be 70 percent of average per-capita income. This may be an underestimate because many pensioners
probably receive closer to the maximum of 100 percent, but we also wanted to take into account the
fact that the pension system covers less than 100 percent of the workforce. Although these estimates
are certainly quite rough, the cross-country differences in national pension polices along this dimension
are also quite large, so that this indicator is nevertheless informative about an important basic
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difference in pension policy. We see in Table 11 that the fast growing economies tend to have much
lower values on this variable than the rest of the countries.
The pay-as-you-go systems prevalent in Europe, and in the advanced industrial economies more
generally, have several features which tend to lower national saving rates. Modern fiscal theory,
especially as pioneered by Feldstein (1974) and Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), teaches that pay-as-
you-go pension benefits reduce national savings in several ways. In general, the benefits are paid for
by taxing the younger workers and transferring the taxes to the retirees. The pay-as-you-go financing
therefore involves a transfer of income from young workers, who tend to have moderate propensities to
consume (given a long life-cycle time horizon ahead), to older retirees, who tend to have much higher
marginal propensities to consume (given a short life-cycle time horizon ahead). Even when retirement
benefits are merely promised for the future, and therefore do not involve any current fiscal spending or
taxation, the mere promise of future retirement income will tend to reduce the saving of the working-
age population, as they anticipate the state provision of their retirement income.
Since the PAYG systems offer benefits essentially unrelated to contributions (or related to
contributions with linkages that are highly complex and therefore not clearly evident to the
worker/taxpayer), there are intense and recurrent political pressures to increase the retirement benefits
for the current retirees, who typically form a powerful interest group. During the 1970s and 1980s,
such pressures in the U. S. and ~urope led to large transfers of income to the elderly from the current
workers and, implicitly, from the yet-unborn generations. In the 1990s, the same phenomenon
occurred in most of the post-communist economies of Central and Eastern Europe.
Even if a political equilibrium is eventually reached, in which current benefits are exactly
financed with current payroll taxes, without further increases in benefits relative to GDP, a long-
standing pay-as-you-go system leaves a permanent negative legacy on national savings. Each worker
pays taxes when young (to be transferred the current elderly), and later receives benefits when old
(paid out of taxes of the future young generation). But the present value of the taxes paid will be
greater than the present value of the benefits received, so that the worker would be better off saving on
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his or her own account. If the government allows the younger workers to opt out of the pay-as-you-go
system, as we recommend below, the government will still be stuck with a large stock of debt,
reflecting the promises that have already been made to current retirees, and to current workers who
have been contributing payroll taxes in anticipation of state retirement benefits. This stock of debt
permanently lowers national saving rates (unless, of course, it is later reduced through a period of
budget surpluses), and thus reflects a lasting adverse legacy of the pay-as-you-go system.
Nonetheless, there are still good reasons to shift partly or fully from the current arrangements
to a national system based on individualized savings accounts. There are two main reasons to make the
shift. The first is political. If benefits are linked directly to individual contributions, there will be less
electoral pressure and indeed fewer institutional mechanisms to raise benefits for current retirees at the
expense of future generations. The second is strictly economic. Under pay-as-you-go systems,
workers tend to receive their state-mandated pensions largely irrespective of their own payroll tax
payments, or at least so it seems to the individual worker. 2 The worker therefore views his or her
payroll "contributions" as taxes on labor income, rather than as saving towards future retirement. The
payroll taxes thereby tend to discourage work effort and labor force participation, and to encourage
black market activity, as we discussed earlier. In an individualized saving system, the same payments
are viewed as contributions by the individual to his or her own savings account, and so do not act as
taxes on labor effort.
There is another aspect of the Malaysian, Singaporean and Taiwanese systems, that might be a
spur to additional household savings. In all three cases, households receive a lump-sum payment upon
retirement, rather than a flow of benefits throughout the remaining lifetime. As Kotlikoff (1995)
explains, the lump-sum payment typically can not be converted, at actuarial value, into an annuity,
because of the thinness of annuity markets. 4 Therefore, households in these three countries have the
incentive to engage in precautionary savings in old age, in order to protect against large medical
expenses or survival well beyond life expectancy. These older households are then subject to leaving
4In turn, this thinness is the result of adverse selection problems in annuity markets.
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unexpected bequests at the time of death, which in turn raises the overall saving rate.
In summary, a pay-as-you-go system has three serious defects. In steady state, it reduces
national saving rates. Outside of the steady state, as in the past two decades, it stokes political
pressures to increase transfers from young to old, further reducing national saving rates. And by
relying on payroll taxation, it tends to discourage work effort and to encourage black-market activity.
In support of the negative linkage from pension policy to private saving rates, we report
savings regressions for the early 1990s in Table 12. The explanatory variables in the saving regression
are our pension policy indicator, the dependency ratio, the government saving rate, the level of income
and GDP growth rate. We find, somewhat surprisingly, that neither the growth rate nor the level of
income is significantly related to savings. In the regression in column (2), we drop these variables and
re-estimate the regression. We find that higher state-provided pensions are associated with lower
national saving, that higher dependency rates are associated with lower national savings, and that
higher government saving rates tend to raise national savings, but by less than one-for-one. Edwards
(1995) also fmds that countries with high levels of government pension spending -- generally the
countries with extensive PAYG systems -- have lower rates of private savings than countries with lower
levels of government pension expenditures.
Technological Improvements
The very rapid growth of the VFGEs resulted mainly from rapid factor accumulation and
allocative efficiency, rather than from technological innovation. In addition, most of the VFGEs
achieved sustained increases in total factor productivity, but as stressed by Young (1995) in the case of
the East Asian economies, the productivity growth played a smaller role than factor accumulation in the
outstanding performance of these economies. Of course, factor accumulation without allocative
efficiency would not prove sustainable (as is shown by the collapse of the communist economies), since
rapid production would not be geared towards market demand. For example, the Soviets invested
heavily in steel production, and indeed achieved rapid growth in steel output, but in the end, the steel
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Table 12. Two-stage least squares estimates of the effect of pension indicators on cross-country savings and
growth.























Part 2. Growth Regressions. Dependent variable: Growth per capita 1990-1995
(Least Squares) (Instrumental Variables)
Log real GDP in 1989 -0.95 -0.86
(-2.58) (-2.20)
Savings ratio 1995 0.16 0.21
(4.37) (4.12)




Note: The instruments for the saving variable in the growth regressions are the pension indicator, the dependency
ratio and the government saving rate.
industry came crashing down since its output dramatically outstripped real market needs. Therefore, it
is the combination of allocative efficiency together with high saving and investment rates that are the
hallmarks of the VFGE's success.
Many observers have argued that government-led industrial policies in East Asia ("picking
winners" through selective protectionism and selective subsidies) gave a special boost to productivity
growth. As a economy-wide proposition, this is doubtful for any of the VFGEs. As we noted earlier,
only Korea among the VFGEs undertook extensive industrial policies, and then only in the 1960s and
1970s. By the early 1980s, the Korean government had pulled back from its most interventionist
policies (especially directed credits to industry and high trade protection for targeted industries), after
its so-called Heavy and Chemical Industry (HCI) Drive during 1973-79 had helped to bring on
macroeconomic instability. The other VFGE governments played a much smaller role than the Korean
government in direct industrial promotion.
Moreover, the results of Korea's interventions were decidedly mixed. Detailed industry
analysis does not reveal positive effects of government interventions on productivity growth (Lee,
1995). In particular, sectoral trade protectionism was consistently correlated with slower productivity
growth in the sector, while tax incentives led to faster capital accumulation in the sector but not faster
productivity growth. Thus, there is little evidence that the capital accumulation thereby promoted
actually increased the overall productivity of the economy. These fmdings are consistent with the
detailed case studies in Perkins, Stern, et. al. (1995), which showed that Korean industrial planning
involved a mix of successes and failures, not the unvarnished successes sometimes imagined. Similar
negative findings regarding Japan's industrial policies have been found by Weinstein, 1995. Direct
comparisons of nearly laissezjaire Hong Kong with more interventionist Singapore, have come down
on the side of Hong Kong (Young, 1993).
Nonetheless, the VFGEs all shared certain policies to promote productivity improvements in
the economy. They have all invested in expanded public education, first to promote universal literacy,
and then secondary and tertiary education. They all promoted the inflow of technology from abroad,
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either through foreign direct investments or through licensing of foreign technologies (the latter
especially in the case of Korea, which tended to shun foreign direct investment until the mid-1980s).
Third, almost all of the countries experimented with special economic zones to encourage new export-
oriented industrial, as well as science parks for high-tech industries in some of the East Asian
countries. These zones are supported by favorable tax treatment, and government provision of certain
infrastructrual support (such as land, energy, communications, warehousing, expedited customs
processing, and support for improved transport linkages to nearby airports and seaports).
Favorable Structural Conditions
The VFGEs also have some natural advantages that have enabled them to pursue rapid export-
led growth. They are all coastal economies, with natural seaports that could be equipped with modern
container port facilities. We shall see below that during the period 1970-1990, landlocked countries
tended to grow more slowly than coastal economies, after controlling for other policy and structural
characteristics. Second, the VFGEs, on the whole, were labor-abundant economies and relatively
scarce in natural resources (Chile and Malaysia are the two exceptions in this regard). The abundance
of labor meant low initial wages and the ability to compete internationally on the basis of labor-
intensive manufactures. These labor-intensive manufactures, such as footwear, apparel, textiles, and
electronics assembly operations1 provided the starting point for export-led industrialization in all of the
VFGEs except for Chile. By contrast, Chile's recent export-led growth has come mainly in agriculture
and resource-based industries. We shall note below that resource-poor economies have tended to grow
more rapidly than resource-rich economies in the past twenty-five years (see Sachs and Warner, 1995b,
for details).
III. Economic Growth and Economic Convergence
In this section, we turn to a more formal econometric analysis of cross-country growth, to
measure the contributions to growth of the various policy and structural variables that we have
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discussed up to this point. We follow the widely used specification of Barro (1991), which describes
country 1's growth rate during a particular interval as a function of the initial level of income of country
I, and other policy and structural variables5 . Let Gi be the growth rate between year 0 and year t,
measured as (1/t)dln(Yit/YiO), where Yit is the level of per capita income in purchasing power parity
terms in year t. YiO, therefore, is the per capita income in the initial year. We write yiO = In(YiO).
We then write:
(1)
According to this specification, the per capita income growth of country I depends on a vector of
structural and policy characteristics of the country, Zi, and on the country's initial log level of per
capita income, yiO. As long as pz is negative, an initially poorer country will tend to grow faster than
an initially richer country, all other things being equal. Therefore, a negative and statistically
significant value of pz indicates conditional convergence, conditional in the sense that we hold
constant the policy and structural characteristics in the Z vector.
We adopt a specification that makes growth depend on initial income and four structural
variables: (1) the Index of Economic Freedom, modified to exclude the sub-index for trade policy
(which is taken into account with SOPEN), to measure the overall extent of market distortions in the
I
economy; (2) the degree of openness of the economy, using the measure SOPEN introduced in Sachs
and Warner (1995a); (3) the dependence of the country on natural resource exports, SXP, as measured
in Sachs and Warner (1995b); and (4) an Index of Market access, to measure the physical access of the
country to sea-based international merchandise trade.
The definitions of the variables are as follows. The IEF has been introduced earlier, and is
described in detail in Heritage Foundation (1996). There are two problems with using the IEF in the
cross-country regression equations. First, the IEF is calculated as of 1995, and is not available for the
period of the regression estimates. Some of the sub-indexes reflect long-term characteristics of the
5 This specification is discussed in more detail in the technical appendix.
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economies, or are averages for many years (e.g. inflation is measured for the interval 1985-93), but
others reflect current characteristics that did not prevail during the 1970s and 1980s. Therefore, the
IEF is measured with error, and if the error is random, contributions of market distortions to slower
growth will be understated by the regression estimates. Second, some of the sub-indexes of the IEF
measure public goods (e.g rule of law) that economies with 20 years of rapid growth may be more
likely to pursue. This means that there may be causality running from growth to the IEF index, and
this will lead us to overstate the impact of changes in the IEF impact on growth. Since these two biases
go in the opposite direction, it is unclear if the net effect is to overstate or understate the relation
between the IEF and growth.
The SOPEN variable is from Sachs and Warner, 1995a, and measures the proportion of years
between 1970 and 1989 that the country is open to trade (i.e. number of years of open trade divided by
20). Openness is measured by four dimensions of trade policy: tariffs, quotas and licensing, export
taxes, and black market premia. A country is deemed to be open if it is sufficiently open on all four
aspects of trade policy. Tariffs must be less than 40 percent on average; quotas and licensing must
cover 40 percent or less of total imports; export taxes must be moderate (see Sachs and Warner, 1995,
for more details); and the blackmarket premium over the official exchange should average less than 20
percent.
The natural resource dependence variable, SXP, is taken from Sachs and Warner, 1995b. It
measures the share of primary exports in GDP in 1971. It is calculated from the World Tables 1993
data diskette. Both the numerator (primary exports) and the denominator (GDP) are measured in
nominal dollars. The dollar GDP data in World Tables uses a smoothed exchange rate to convert local
currency GDP to dollar GDP. Primary exports are the sum of the categories "non-fuel primary
products" and "fuels." Non-fuel primary products cover SITe categories 0, 1,2,4, and 68. Fuels
cover SITe category 3. These categories are from revision 1 of the SITe.
The fifth variable is an Index of Market Access (access). As international trade is one of the
key engines of economic growth (through its effects on the diffusion of knowledge, the size of the
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market, domestic competition, and so forth), countries physically cut off from international trade are
likely to suffer lower rates of economic growth, all other things equal. Since shipping by sea plays the
overwhelming role in international merchandise trade, we focus on measuring each country's physical
access to international shipping. Countries that are landlocked, or are for other reasons are without sea
ports, have a much higher cost of integration in the world market economy than coastal economies with
sea ports.
Our index of physical access gives countries a value of 1 if it is completely landlocked, and if it
lacks river-access to sea ports in other countries. Countries with container ports are given a value of O.
Countries that are landlocked but have some river-access to sea ports in other countries (e.g.
Switzerland, linked to the North Sea port at Rotterdam by the Rhine River port at Basel) are given a
value greater than 0 and less than 1, depending upon the navigability of the riverway. Similarly,
countries with coastlines but without container ports (which may occur, for example, because of poor
natural conditions of the coastline), are given a value of 0.1, signifying almost full access, but not full
access. The access variable is expected to enter the regression estimates with a negative sign,
signifying that landlocked countries grow less rapidly than coastal economies, all other things equal.
Finally, note that we measure per capita income (and growth of per capita income) as GDP per
economically active population (aged 20-65), rather than as GDP per total population. This is based on
the natural view that GDP is pr9duced by those in the workforce. Some countries have economically
active populations that are growing much faster than the overall population (because of a rising
proportion of the population in the age group 20-65). We would expect these countries to grow faster
in terms of GDP per total population as a result of the rise in the proportion of the population that is of
working age. Preliminary tests of the cross-country growth equations using GDP per economically
active population, and GDP per total population, favored our choice of variable.
Note that we do not initially include the national saving rate as one of the right-hand-side
variables, though we do add the saving rate in later regressions. This is because the saving rate is
neither a structural variable nor a policy variable, but is rather a reflection of underlying economic
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policies, such as government saving rates and pension systems. We note that earlier, in Table 12, we
report estimated regressions where savings depends on these variables and where these variables are
also used as instruments for saving rates in growth regressions. The regressions in Table 12 use a
smaller sample of about 40 countries where all the data are available to perform this analysis.
Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient data to conduct the same analysis for the larger set of
countries over the fu1l20-Year period 1970-1990, but we can draw some useful conclusions from the
regressions on the smaller sample in Table 12.
The saving regressions in Table 12 support the idea that high state-provided pensions serve to
depress national saving, after holding constant the effects of demographics, government saving, lagged
income and lagged growth. The growth regressions in Table 12 support the idea that saving rates help
explain cross country growth. Note that the estimated effect of saving on growth is higher when the
saving effect is estimated with instrumental variables. This provides some evidence against the concern
that the saving coefficient has an upward bias when it is estimated with least squares. The estimated
savings coefficients from the growth regressions over the longer period (1970-1990), which we later
use in growth simulations, are uniformly lower than these estimates.
We turn now to estimated growth regressions that use a larger sample of countries and cover
earlier, and longer, time periods. These are reported in Table 13. As we explain in the technical
appendix, the regression coeffic,ients are actually non-linear functions of the parameters in the growth
equation. This means that the coefficients cannot be read directly as estimates of the ~ parameters in
the growth regression. Therefore, in the last two columns of Table 13, we report the estimates of the
Ws that correspond to regressions (1) and (3). Note that the estimated Ws are close, but not identical,
to the regression coefficients. The estimated Ws are typically about 16 percent larger than the
corresponding coefficients in the regression equation.
In the regression estimated over the longer time period, regression (1), we see that all of
coefficients are of the expected sign and statistical significance (t-statistics are reported in parentheses).
Over the shorter period, all variables are of the expected sign, but the market access variable falls
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Table 13. Cross Cmmtry Growth Regressions
Dependent variable is Growth in real GDP per economically active population
Explanatory 1970-89 1986-90 1970-89 1986-90 Estimates of the Ws
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) regr. (1) regr. (3)
Log of real GDP
at the beginning
of the period -1.49 -0.88 -1.38 -1.15 -O.ol77 -0.0161
(t-ratio) (-5.38) (-2.45) (-5.95) (-3.60)
Openness 1.63 3.36 1.77 3.03 0.0194 0.0207
(3.32) (3.64) (3.93) (3.73)
Natural Resource
Intensity -3.12 -8.86 -5.04 -7.06 -0.0370 -0.0590
(-2.63) (-4.48) (-4.89) (-3.99)
Access to Sea -1.76 -1.01 -1.03 -0.57 -0.0209 -0.0119
(-2.26) (-1.04) (-1.72) (-0.67)
Economic Freedom
Rating -0.75 -1.35 -0.67 -0.67 -0.0089 -0.0078
(-2.24) (-2.39) (-2.23) (-1.30)
Savings Rate 0.112 0.146 0.00131
(5.17) (4.89)
R2 0.530 0.478 0.643 0.573
N 79 85 77 83
SE 1.37 2.36 1.18 2.07
below statistical significance. Looking at regression 1, we see strong evidence for conditional
convergence, since the regression coefficient is -1.49 (t = -5.38), and the estimate of pz is -1.77.
According to this estimate, an economy half as rich per capita as another economy will tend to grow
faster by 1.23 percentage points per year (= - 1.77 x In(0.5». On this basis, for example, Poland
would initially grow faster than the EU, holding all other variables the same, by 2.07 percent per year,
since Poland starts out at just 31 percent of the EU average (2.07 = -1.77 x In(.31». Of course, this
growth advantage would narrow over time, as Poland converges with the EU average.
Openness is also highly significant. The average difference in annual growth between an
always-open economy (SOPEN = 1) and an always-closed economy (SOPEN = 0) was 1.94
percentage points per year, which would cumulate to a 44 percent difference in real GDP over the 19
year period between 1970 and 1989, (y(0)*1.019419 =y(0)*1.44). The IEF is also significant, both
economically and statistically. Consider the difference between the Index of Economic Freedom of the
VFGEs (IEF = 1.96) and SGEs (IEF = 3.08). This difference is estimated to account for 1.00 percent
per year, or 21 percent over the 19-year interval. As noted above, this may be an underestimate, since
it fails to measure the "true" value of the IEF on average for the regression period, and instead relies
on an estimate as of 1995. By 1995, many of the extreme anti-market distortions of the developing
countries that prevailed during the 1970s and 1980s had been reduced or eliminated.
Natural-resource intensity and market access (to the sea) also are important determinants of
growth, but they don't explain much of the difference between the VFGEs and the SGEs since both
resource intensity and access to the sea are similar in the two groups of countries (none of the VFGEs
or the SGEs is landlocked). For a landlocked country, however, the effect is large. The difference in
growth between a coastal country with a container port facility, and a landlocked country without any
river access to a seaport, is enormous. The regression estimate suggests that complete landlockedness
reduces growth by 2.09 percentage points per year.
The regression estimate over the shorter recent period might be more informative regarding the
role of market distortions, because of the more appropriate timing of the IEF. As in regression 1, there
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is strong evidence of convergence, as well as for the role of the key policy and structural variables.
The main differences in magnitude of coefficients are as follows. The point estimate of openness is
larger in the shorter period, rising to 2.07. Natural resource intensity is far larger, probably reflecting
the sharp terms of trade losses suffered by the resource-based economies after the mid-1980s. The
market access variable has a smaller, and statistically insignificant coefficient. The coefficient on IEF
is markedly larger, which is consistent with the idea that measurement error in the longer-period
regression served to understate this effect.
In regressions 3 - 4, we add the national saving rate (calculated as [GDP - C - G]/GDP, with C
and G being private and public consumption spending). Somewhat remarkably, given the
multicollinearity of the right-hand-side variables, the saving rate enters regression 3 with economic and
statistical significance, and without affecting the statistical or economic significance of the other right-
hand-side variables (the one exception is the market access variable). According to the estimate, an
increase in the saving rate of 10 percentage points of GDP is estimated to raise the growth rate by 1.3
percentage points per year. The coefficient 0.13 is within the range of the usual estimates in other
studies (which are typically between 0.1 and 0.2), but is smaller than our instrumental variables
regressions reported in Table 12. In the regression estimate for the shorter period, all variables enter
with the expected sign, but the IEF variable and the market access variable are not significant. The
coefficient on saving and openness rise compared to the longer period regression.
We now use the regression estimates to calculate the time needed for a poorer economy to close
a given amount of income gap with a richer counterpart. Consider two countries, I and j, with yi <
yj. Let Dij(t) = ~1' [Zi(t) - Zj(t)], and let yet) be the log difference in income levels, yet) = yi(t) -
yj(t). Since dy(t)/dt = Gi(t) - Gj(t), we can write:
(2) yet) = DP) - ~2 yet)
Equation (2) is a first-order differential equation with the well-known solution given in (3):
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(3)
Using (3), for a given initial gap in incomes yeO), and a given path of structural differences, Dij(t), we
can readily calculate the time path of the log difference in per capita income. In particular, we can find
the time needed for.the gap to be closed to any particular target level. In the special case that Dij(t) is a
constant value, (3) becomes:
(3') D. -p i D ij]y(T) = ----'L + e 2 y(O)--
Pz Pz
and we can solve for t algebraically.
In Table 14, we make calculations of the number of years that would be required for the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland to reach 70 percent of the EU average, and 90 percent of the EU
average, under alternative assumptions about the saving rate and the economic freedom index. We
construct three alternative scenarios. In the first scenario, we assume that both variables remain fixed
at their most recent values. These values are given below:
Saving rate Index of Economic Freedom
Czech Republic 21.2 2.11
Hungary 17.1 2.78
Poland 18.8 2.90
European Union 21.1 2.30
Very Fast Growing Economies 32.8 1.96
In the second scenario, we assume that each of the three Central European countries harmonize
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Table 14. Years Required to Close the Gap with the European Union
1993 GDP "Policy" Years to Raise GDP to Years to Raise GDP to
as Percent of Action 70 percent of the 90 percent of the
EU Average! EU average EU average
Czech
Republic 53 Keep Current Policies 23 56
Hannonize with EU 36 III
Harmonize with VFGE 10 20
Hungary 48 Keep Current Policies not obtainable with current policies
Harmonize with EU 45 120
Harmonize with VFGE 13 23
Poland 36 Keep Current Policies 194 not obtainable
Hannonize with EU 65 141
Harmonize with VFGE 21 31
1 Taken from table 2 column 5. Note that these are, if anything, optimistic estimates of the initial income level since
they take at face value the estimates of the share of the unofficial economy in Central Europe, and assume that the
share in the European Union is only 5 percent.
with the level of the ED average. From the table above, we can see that this means SR =21.1 and
IEF=2.3. In this scenario, by definition, there are no policy or structural differences between the
CEEs and the ED, so Dij(t) = 0 in all future years; the greater growth experienced by the CEEs comes
solely from the fact that they begin with a lower initial income. In the third scenario, we assume that
each of the three Central European countries harmonize with the level of the very fast growing
economies (SR=32.8, IEF=1.96). That is, the CEEs adopt a rapid-growth strategy based on the high-
saving and low-market distortion policies of the VFGEs. This third scenario, of course, will produce
the fastest rate of convergence with the ED.
The results are shown in Table 14. Let T70 signify the number of years until the CEE is at the
70 percent level of the ED, and T90 signify the number of years until it reaches 90 percent of the ED.
For each country, we calculate three values for T70 and three values for T90, based on the three policy
scenarios.
The first point to mention is that if Hungary maintains its current low saving rate and current
IEF score of 2.78, our estimates of the growth equation imply that its real income will plateau at a level
below 70 percent of the ED average. Consequently it will never achieve 70 or 90 percent of the ED
average under current policies. For similar reasons our estimates imply that with current policies
Poland will never reach 90 percent of the ED average. The technical explanation for this result is in
the technical appendix. Essenti~lly it comes from the fact that the parameter estimates in our growth
regressions imply that all countries are currently in a process of transition between their current per-
capita income and their long-run income. The speed of transition (the growth rate) is higher the larger
is the gap between current income and long-run income, but the level of long-run income is determined
by the structural and policy variables. It is possible for relatively poor economies (which have large
gaps between current and potential income) to have at once a high speed of transition (high growth) and
a low level of long run income (because of inefficient policies). Our calculations imply that with its
savings rate of 18.8 percent and its Index of Economic Freedom of 2.9, Poland's long-term income will
be around 72 percent of the ED's. This is why, with current policies, Poland is shown in Table 14 to
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reach 70 percent of the EU average, but never to reach 90 percent of the EU average.
The second important point from Table 14 is that it will take a very long time for the Central
European Economies to achieve European standards of living if they simply adopt prevailing European
policies. Harmonization with the EU is not the path to rapid convergence with the EU. Our
calculations suggest that with EU policies it would take the Czech Republic 111 years, Hungary 120
years, and Poland 141 years to reach 90 percent of the EU average income! Thus, even though the
Central European countries may be expected to grow faster by virtue of their low initial income, this
advantage alone is not sufficient to achieve very rapid convergence with the European Union.
With policies oriented toward rapid growth, however, Table 14 shows that the time until
convergence can be dramatically reduced. Our calculations suggest that if the Central European
countries adopt the policies of the fast growing economies, the time until Hungary reaches 90 percent
of the EU can be cut from 120 years to 23 years, and the time until Poland reaches 90 percent can be
cut from 141 years to 31 years. Similarly, the time to reach 70 percent of the EU average can be cut
from 36 to 10 years for the Czech republic, from 45 to 13 years for Hungary and from 65 to 21 years
for Poland.
We can also estimate the different growth rates that the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland
can initially expect to achieve under these three scenarios. The results are presented in Table 15.
Since we need a reference point to begin with, we start by assuming that each country can, at a
minimum, match the average per-worker growth of the European Union, which we assume to be 2
percent per year, as shown in the first row for each country in Table 15. This 2 percent growth
assumption is somewhat arbitrary, but it corresponds to the average growth in the European Union in
the past 15 years. In the next row, we add to this the forecasts for the average growth in the labor
force, to arrive at an estimate of GDP growth. Since these forecasts for labor force growth are low,
we can see from the table that this does not add much to the overall growth rates. In the third row, we
add the extra growth that each country can expect to achieve purely from the fact that they start out
with a lower per-capita income. We call this the catch-up effect. This catch-up effect is generally
38
Table 15. Central European Growth Prospects Under Alternative Policies
Baseline EU Standards VFGE Standards
CZECH REPUBLIC
Baseline Growth Rate 2.00 2.00 2.00
Labor force 0.45 0.45 0.45
Catch-up 1.03 1.03 1.03
Economic Efficiency 0.15 0.00 0.27
Saving Rate 0.23 0.00 1.53
Total Growth Rate 3.64 3.48 6.58
HUNGARY
Baseline 2.00 2.00 2.00
Labor force -0.38 -0.38 -0.38
Catch-up 1.19 1.19 1.19
Economic Efficiency -0.38 0.00 0.27
Saving Rate -0.52 0.00 1.53
Total 1.91 2.81 4.61
POLAND
Baseline 2.00 2.00 2.00
Labor force 0.65 0.65 0.65
Catch-up 1.65 1.65 1.65
Economic Efficiency -0.47 0.00 0.27
Saving Rate -0.30 0.00 1.53
Total 3.53 4.30 6.10
large, as we would expect given the currently low levels of real income. Based on our regression
estimates, we estimate that this effect will add about 1.7 percentage points to Polish growth, 1.2 points
to Hungary's growth, and 1.0 point to the Czech Republic's growth.
In the fourth row and below, we consider the effect of the different policy scenarios indicated
in each column, so that the numbers also vary across the columns. Again based on our regression
estimates, we estimate that if Poland does not change its policies and thus maintains its current rating
on the IEF, it would loose about 0.5 percentage points in growth compared to the European Union's
standards. Similarly, if it maintained its current savings rate of 18.8 percent, which is also below the
EU's average of 21.1 percent, it would loose another 0.3 points. To summarize, we can see from the
last number in column 1, that if Poland maintains its current policies, and the EU grows at 2 percent
per year, Poland's growth in total GDP is estimated to be 3.5 percent per year.
There are three important conclusions from this table. First, even under current policies, we
can expect the growth rates of the Czech Republic and Poland to be high by European standards,
mainly by virtue of the fact that they start out far below the EU average. Second, further
harmonization with the European Union will only lead to a modest increase in these growth rates (and
will actually lower growth of the Czech Republic since its saving rate is slightly higher than the EU's).
Finally, and most importantly, harmonization with the standards of the very fast growing economies
will lead to a large increases in ,expected growth rates. We estimate that with VFGE policies the Czech
Republic can grow at 6.6 percent, Hungary can grow at 4.6 percent and Poland can grow at 6.1
percent.
II. Can the CEEs sustain very fast growth?
Can the CEEs achieve very fast growth rates, at magnitudes needed to reach half of the average
income level of the European Union within the next quarter century? Can they apply the lessons of the
VFGEs in the European context?
A first sobering observation is that the poorer EU economies have mostly failed to achieve very
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high rates of growth. The PEUEs probably offer the best guess of future CEE performance, since the
PEUEs show the performance of poorer peripheral European economies under the real political and
institutional conditions of EU membership. Spain and Portugal grew rapidly in the mid-1980s, but then
got bogged down in fiscal difficulties in the 1990s. While Portugal achieved a growth rate of 5.2
percent during 1985-90, it managed just 1.2 percent during 1990-95. Spain has just managed 1.5
percent per annum during the first half of the 1990s. Greece has done even worse, essentially mired in
crisis since the late 1980s. Only Ireland has seen an acceleration of growth, to the point where it was
the fastest growing economy in the EU in 1994, and perhaps the fastest in all of the OECD.
If we point to the one critical area where the PEUEs fail to emulate the VFGEs, it is surely the
area of fiscal policy. The PEUEs all have large governments; extensive social welfare systems; high
rates of labor taxation; and heavy reliance on PAYG financing of social security. The large
government leads to moderate-to-high values of market distortion (compare the IEF values of the
PEUEs and the VFGEs, in Table 4), and to low or moderate saving rates (see Table 9). Three of the
four (all but Ireland) saw steep increases in public spending and taxation as a percent of GDP during
the 1980s and first half of the 1990s. Notably, Ireland bucked the trend after 1986, reducing total
government spending from 53 percent of GDP in that year to around 43 percent of GDP in 1994. The
rise of government spending and taxation in the other three countries has been associated with a rising
tax wedge; a high and rising rate of unemployment during the 1980s and early 1990s; and a falling rate
of national saving.
The Central European economies are subject to the same fiscal pressures as the PEUEs, and are
therefore susceptible to the same mediocre long-term growth performance. The fiscal pressures are
common to the PEUEs and the CEEs for several reasons. First, these fiscal pressures reflect a
common ideological commitment to a universal social welfare state -- a European-wide commitment
that even transcended the differences in economic systems between East and West before the 1990s.
Second, they reflect the pressures, both political and legal, of the acquis communitaire, that is the
accumulated body of law of the European Union. As the CEEs want to join the EU, they will be
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pushed to harmonize social policy, fiscal policy, taxation policy, and other areas of economic
management. With harmonization may well come a further push towards a large government role in
the economy, including an expensive, PAYG social welfare system. Third, the CEEs, like the PEDEs,
are subject to the political and economic ratchet effects of entitlement spending. Once generous social
insurance systems are in place, they are extremely difficult to unwind. Interest groups, particularly of
the elderly, have proven to be formidable opponents to any attempts to trim the prevailing social
insurance system. Public trade unions, especially in France, Italy, Spain, and the CEEs, have also
fought for the retention and even expansion of the prevailing entitlement.
While this outcome is likely, it is not inevitable. The ED itself is going through deep soul-
searching over the role of the state, as country after country reaches a point of fiscal stress. Perhaps
the CEEs will be able to take a faster step towards a smaller, and growth-promoting state, since the
economic institutions in the CEEs are probably still more malleable, and subject to reform, than in the
ED itself. Let us therefore return to the three clusters of characteristics that promote the rapid growth
of the VFGEs: allocative efficiency, inter-temporal efficiency, and technological efficiency. We can
assess the prospects of the CEEs in each area, to see their prospects of emulating the high-growth
performance of the VFGEs.
Allocative efficiency
There is no doubt that the CEEs have achieved a stupendous breakthrough in allocative
efficiency since the start of market reforms. The introduction of market forces, underpinned by
administrative, political, and legal changes, has allowed these economies to become full-fledged market
economies in a relative short period of time, approximately one-half decade. As the 1995 Transition
Report of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development makes clear, the leading
reformers (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) have completed the
basic tasks of legal and institutional reform, and have even reached Western European best practices in
several key areas, such as the openness of the economy to international trade. Within another few
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years, the CEEs should rival the Western European economies in other areas of legal and
administrative reform.
There is also little doubt that the rise in allocative efficiency is already paying off, in export-led
GDP growth. All of the leading reforms have restored positive growth in 1995, after several years in
which the introduction of market reforms forced the downsizing or liquidation of the old, heavy
industrial enterprises. Much of the new growth is corning in small, export-oriented enterprises, as well
as in services. Foreign direct investment is also starting to increase, with foreign-owned enterprises in
the CBBs increasingly helping to integrate the region into European-wide, or even global, production
networks.
The cross-country evidence after five years of reform suggests that the strongest market
reformers have experienced the mildest downturns in measured economic activity and the fastest
recoveries. This evidence is shown in Figures 1(a) and (b), where we plot economic growth against the
degree of market reforms. The Index of Market Reforms (IMR) is an index constructed on the basis of
BBRD measures of reform progress in the post-communist economies. The IMR is the simple sum of
sub-indexes constructed by the EBRD to measure the progress of market reforms along nine
dimensions, including: large-enterprise privatization, small-enterprise privatization, enterprise
restructuring, price liberalization, trade and foreign exchange liberalization, competition policy,
banking and interest rate reform, securities market reform, and legal institutions governing investment.
We see the strong positive relationship between the Index of Market Reform and economic growth,
both cumulative growth, 1989-95, and (projected) economic growth in 1995. Clearly, the faster
reformers have experienced a smaller cumulative downturn, and a faster recovery as of 1995. Indeed,
all of the leading reformers are expected to show economic growth in 1995.
By 1995, the CBBs had made considerable progress in all of the major areas of reform. In the
crucial area of trade and exchange rate liberalization, the BBRD judges that six of the countries (Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) have reached the standards of the
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Fig. 1. The relationship of economic reforms and economic growth in Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union: (A) cumulative GDP change 1989-1994, and (B) GDP growth, 1994.
institutional re-ordering, even for the three leading CEEs (Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland). As
shown in Table 9, these countries still have a state sector of 30 percent or more of GDP, according to
the EBRD estimates. They also lag behind the advanced industrial countries in several areas of legal
and administrative development, including: banking reform, securities market development, and
competition policy.
The reforms to date are enough to generate gradual convergence with the EU, but not rapid
convergence. In our view, CEE growth rates comparable to the VFGEs are in fact achievable, but
only with a decisive medium-term reduction of the size of the state, particularly in budgetary spending
and the provision of retirement pensions. As with the poorer EU countries, the CEEs carry a legacy of
a very large public budget as a percent of GDP. Interestingly, and regrettably, the size of the
government spending and taxation as a proportion of GDP has not declined since the onset ofrefonns
in 1989. What has happened, instead, is that the composition of the state spending has· changed, without
reducing the overall levels as a percent of GDP.
The most important change, evident in Table 16, is a sharp cut in budget subsidies to
enterprises and households, which has been essentially offset by a steep increase in social spending as a
percent of GDPI Thus, while Poland cut budgetary subsidies by 9.6 percentage points of GDP between
1989 and 1993, it simultaneously increased social spending by 11 percentage points, from 10 percent of
GDP to 21 percent of GDP. The bulk of the increased spending went to retirement pensions, as
middle-aged Poles took up the options of early retirement and of generous qualification for disability
pensions. The number of pensioners rose by a startling 28 percent during 1989 to 1993, at time when
the overall population increase was a mere 1.5 percent. By 1993, roughly 32 percent of Polish adults
were pensioners, compared with just 21 percent of the adult population in the United States. A sharp
growth of the number of pensioners, and of pension spending as a percent of GDP, has occurred in
most of the other transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe.
The result of these budgetary changes is that total public spending as a percent of GDP remains
around 50 percent, among the highest in the world, and certainly the highest for market economies at
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Table 16. From Subsidies to Social Expenditure in 3 Transition Economies
Subsidies Social Spending
1989 1993 1989 1993
Czech Republic 16.61 13.21 14.6
Hungary 10.7 3.1 15.8 22.5
Poland 12.9 3.3 10.0 21.0
I For Czechoslovakia.
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report, 1994, and national data.
comparable levels of income. In Table 7, we offered comparisons of fiscal expenditure in the CEEs
with other countries. The CEEs have a particularly high level of government consumption spending;
total government expenditures; and government revenues as a percent of GDP. As we saw in Table 8,
the high overall levels of tax collection are reflected as well in high marginal tax rates, and a tax wedge
on labor income that is vastly higher than in the VFGEs, the SGEs, and even the PEDEs.
Oddly, while overall government spending is very high, budgetary investment spending is
actually low in comparison with the VFGEs. It is difficult to make precise comparisons of the level of
public investment, since a considerable amount of such spending will be off-budget, on the accounts of
state enterprises. Nonetheless, it is likely that the Central European economies have squeezed
infrastructure spending dramatically to make room for large current expenditures, particularly transfer
payments.
The main effects of extremely high public expenditure and taxation in the CEEs are likely to
include: a substantial disincentive to labor supply; a rise in the long-term unemployment rate; an
encouragement of black-market activities; a reduced inflow of foreign direct investment; large public
deficits; and a reduction in national saving rates. We can see many of these effects already at play in a
comparison of the CEBs with the VFGEs. Public sector saving is lower; deficits are higher; and
overall national saving and investment rates are far lower.
Pension Reform in the CEEs
The current heavy pension spending in the CEEs can be justified as a one-time inter-
generational transfer from the young and unborn workers to the current population over age 50.
After all, it is the older middle aged workers and the retirees that have the most difficult time adjusting
to the new market economy, and therefore stand to suffer the largest losses of income as a direct result
of the market reforms (and the high inflation that preceded it). The evidence from Poland suggests that
in this regard, the heavy pension spending has been successful: the real consumption of the older
population has been maintained throughout the transition. Even more notably, life expectancy has
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continued to rise in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland despite the tumult of the transition (and
the sharp declines in life expectancy in the post-communist economies of the former Soviet Union).
Nonetheless, it would prove to be enormously costly if the current pay-as-you-go pension
system becomes permanent, with today's younger workers viewing the current levels of pension
payments as entitlement that they will also receive in the future. Pension reform in the CEEs should
involve two major changes in the next decade: (1) a phase out of pay-as-you-go financing, with its
replacement by an individualized savings account system as in Chile, Malaysia, and Singapore; and (2)
a more realistic level of benefits and terms for qualification for future retirees within the state-funded
pension system. The most ambitious reform would completely phase out the pay-as-you-go system, as
Chile succeeded in doing in its 1978 reforms.
The basic mechanics of a shift from a PAYG to a funded, individual-savings system are as
follows. Current pensioners continue to receive their benefits as if the system had remained unchanged
(though the specific level of benefits might, of course, be adjusted). All workers who currently
contribute to the system shift to an individual savings account, so that contributions in the future are
deposited in the individual accounts. In addition, workers receive an initial "endowment" of equities
and government bonds in their individual accounts, reflecting their previous "contributions" through
payroll taxation. In Chile, this initial balance in the savings accounts was termed the "recognition
bond," in recognition of past tax payments.
The recognition bonds immediately add to the stock of government debt, but this additional
stock of debt is not really new debt. Rather, the government's commitment to future social security
benefits already represents an implicit stock of government debt, which is now made explicit through
the recognition bonds. The fact that current retirees must now be financed through general government
revenues, rather than tax payments of the young, also adds a new flow deficit to the budget, but one
that is matched by a reduced commitment to government retirement spending in the future (since
retirement benefits will then come out of the assets in the individualized accounts, rather than from the
budget). In a mechanical sense, the flow deficit can be readily financed: the pension-reform law can
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mandate that the individualized accounts be invested largely in government debt in the first few years,
in order to ensure the financing of the flow deficit. Alternatively, the government might offset part or
all of the flow deficit through expenditure cuts or tax increases. Chile, for example, managed to
finance its transition in the early 1980s through government surpluses on non-pension spending, which
were used to cover the pension payments to the existing retirees.
In the case of Central Europe, workers should not receive the full actuarial value of their past
contributions, since some ofthose contributions should be recognized as a one-time, uncompensated
transfer of income from the young to the older generation. As an illustrative example, workers 50-55
might receive enough to ensure them 90 percent of the current benefits (taking into account their
continuing contributions up to retirement age); workers 45-50 might receive enough to ensure 75
percent of the current benefits; and so forth, with reduced recognition bonds for younger workers.
Workers currently 25 and younger might receive nothing, despite previous payroll taxation. At the
same time, the retirement age should also be raised gradually.
The CEEs might be able to use an additional mechanism to fund the transition. Rather than
paying recognition obligations exclusively in the form of government bonds, the CEE governments
could also allocate some of the remaining state-owned equities to the funding of individualized savings
accounts. In particular, the government would create diversified portfolios of state-enterprise shares
which they would transfer to private investment trusts. The workers would then receive shares in the
investment trusts as part of their initial balances.
There are, of course, many detailed issues that have to be resolved in the changeover from a
PAYG system to an individualized system, including some of the following issues. First, who will
manage the individualized accounts? Chile has relied on a regulated, private-sector, pension-fund
industry, while Singapore and Malaysia have relied on centralized government funds that manage all of
the savings. Second, what prudential standards will govern the management of the individualized
accounts? There are many important choices here, involving the balance between government bonds
and equities, and domestic versus foreign assets. Third, what will be the coverage of the new system?
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Will participation be mandatory? Is there a minimum mandatory contribution (as a proportion of
income) that each participant must make? These questions can be resolved, but inherently they must be
tailored to national conditions, and are in any event beyond the scope of this paper.
Other remaining tasks for achieving high growth in the CBBs
The CEEs have several important growth-promoting tasks in addition to the completion of
market reforms (especially privatization and financial market deepening) andfiscal reform (especially
pension reform) to lower tax distortions and raise national saving rates. Three addition areas of
concern include: (1) membership in the European Union in the near future; (2) improvements in
infrastructure and education; and (3) a medium-term government strategy to support very fast growth.
De Crombrugghe, Minton-Beddoes, and Sachs (1995) stress the importance of rapid accession
of the CEEs to the European Union. A clear target date for membership is important to lock in the
economic reforms in Central Europe, and to boost investor confidence with regard to the CEEs' market
access to the EU. Without a clear timetable for accession, there is the possibility of a vicious circle of
loss of confidence in market reforms and falling investment spending in the CEEs, thereby confirming
the view of some in the EU that accession should be delayed for decades, not years. Most of the
perceived difficulties of accession can be overcome if a few basis principles are recognized. First, the
CEEs need market access, not [mancial aid from the EU. Therefore, the CEEs should unilaterally
renounce their desire for a significant share of the EU structural funds, in return for rapid accession.
Second, the CEEs should join the EU with a long transition period, presumably a decade from the time
of membership, in which to harmonize agricultural policy and free labor mobility. Third, the CEEs
should opt out of the Social Charter (e.g. in return for agreeing to a postponement of free mobility of
labor), as these economies should not be further burdened with high social costs at this point.
Together with rapid accession, the CEEs need to pursue a coherent medium-term strategy for
expanded infrastructure investment spending, especially infrastructure linked to economic integration
with Western Europe. Since the CEEs will aim for export-led growth, with a strong inflow of foreign
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direct investment, they should focus their infrastructure spending on transport and communications
facilities, especially in those projects linked to the European Union grid. Education is the other area for
a major public spending commitment, in order to increase the scope and quality of tertiary education.
For all of this, the government requires a clear medium-term strategy. We believe that such a
strategy should rest on six pillars that we have discussed throughout this text: (1) completion of main
institutional steps of market reform, including most importantly the completion of privatization and
deepening of the rule of law; (2) deep fiscal reform, to reduce the share of government spending and
taxation in GDP; (3) investing in infrastructure, especially in transport and communications, in order to
speed and deepen the economic integration with the EU markets; (4) membership in EU, but without
accession to the Social Charter and to other aspects of EU policy that would tend to exacerbate the size
of the state; (5) science, technology, and education policies to spur productivity growth; and (6) setting
appropriate (and ambitious) growth targets for the next ten years, with the aim of emulating the growth
performance of the VFGEs.
IV. Conclusion
We have noted that the CEEs are likely to experience economic convergence with the European
Union, assuming that CEE econpmic policies are harmonized with those of the EU. On the other hand,
the speed of convergence is likely to be relatively slow if policies do no more than achieve
harmonization on EU standards. The CEEs should instead aim to achieve very high growth targets, by
emulating the fiscal policies of the very-fast-growing middle-income countries. These fiscal policies
include low rates of marginal taxation, low levels of current government expenditure as a percent of
GDP, relatively high levels of government investment expenditure, and pension policies based on
individual savings accounts rather than pay-as-you-go transfers. Pension reform merits a prominent




The growth equation in the text (see equation 1) is reproduced below with the time drivative of the log
of output (the instantaneous growth rate) on the left hand side, and the log level of output on the right
hand side. This emphasizes that it is essentially a differential equation,
where y is the natural log of GDP per economically active population, PI is a vector of coefficients
corresponding to the variables in the vector Z, and pz is a parameter that determines the rate at which
the economy converges to its level of income in the steady state. In a cross section of economies at
different income levels, this parameter also determines the rate at which poorer economies 'catch up' to
wealthier economies. When the parameters and the Z's do not vary over time, this equation may be
integrated from time 0 to time T and rearranged to obtain.
~ T F Po + P;Zi
y(T) = e 2 y(O) + (l-e 2) ---
-Pz
This equation clarifies the implicit model of the growth process. In this framework, all countries are
assumed to be on a transition path between their current income level and their steady state income
level. The current income is given by the term yeO), and the steady state income is given by the term
(~o+ ~l 'Z)/ -~z. Note that the equation says that actual income at any date "TOO in the future will be a
weighted average of current income and steady state income, with the respective weights given by the
terms e~T and 1-e~T. For example, if the estimate of pz is -0.0177, (see column 5 of table 13), and T is
20, the weights would be 0.70 and 0.30. If instead Twas 40, the weights would be 0.5 and 0.5. This
shows that estimated rate of convergence to the steady state is quite slow, according to our estimates.
Even after 40 years, a country will have closed only one-half of the gap between it's current income
and its steady state income.
A.2. Estimation Issues
Of course, growth rates are not measured instantaneously. Instead, we measure average
percentage growth between year "0" and year "T" as 100 times the difference in log GDP divided by
the number of years, that is, 100*(y(T)-y(0))/T. Hence, we write the growth equation in a form that
corresponds to the way we actually measure growth. Subtracting y(O) from both sides, multiplying by
100, and dividing by the number of years (T), we obtain the following.
100* y(1)-y(O)
T
This form of the equation corresponds to the data we use in the estimation. Note that the estimated
coefficient on initial income, y(O), should be interpreted as an estimate of the term -100*(1-eP2 T)/T
rather than simply P2' Similarly, the estimated coefficient on any of the variables in Z, should be
interpreted as an estimate of the term 100*(1-eP2 ~Pl / P2 T rather than simply Pl . To recover estimates
of the p's we have two choices. One is to use the result from asymptotic statistics that plim(g( &)) =
g(plim(&)), which states that if we have a consistent estimate of the function of the estimated parameter
we can recover a consistent estimate of the parameter itself by algebraic solution. The second is to
estimate the equation as a non-linear function. We choose the first of these options. For example, the
estimated regression coefficient on initial income (table 13 column 1) of -1.49 is really an estimate of
the term -100*(1-eP2T)/T. Solving for P2 from the equation -1.49=-100*(1-eP2T)/T yields P2 =-0.0177.
In table 13 we report both the estimated regression coefficients as well as the implied estimates of the
p's.
A.3. Further calculations.
Note also that we can again integrate the differential equation from 0 to T separately for two
countries "i" and "j", and subtract the equation for "j" from "i" to obtain.
/
Y i(1)_yj(1) = (y i(O)_yj(O»e P2T + (1-e P2T) ~ (Z i_Z j)
-P2
Now we defme some terms to simplify this equation. Let yet) denote the difference in log GDP at time
T between two countries, hence y(t)=yi(t)-yj(t). We call this the log income gap. It is sometimes
clearer to express the income gap as a percent, that is, the income of the poorer country as a percent of
the richer country. We call this the percent income gap and denote it as yP(t)=lOO*yi(t)/yj(t). Of
course, these two ways of expressing the income gap are always related by the equation
y(t)=ln(yP(t)/lOO). Furthermore, let Dij represent the (weighted) difference in the Z variables of any
two countries, with the weights given by the estimated regression parameters, hence Dij = Pl'(Zi -Zj).
Then the we can write an equation that describes the time path of the log income gap between any two
countries, conditional on the parameters and the Dij terms.
p ~:z: D..
yeT) = y(O)e 2 +(l-e 2 )-')
-~2
This equation is important to understanding our results. It says that the log income gap between any
two countries will be a weighted average of the current income gap and the steady state income gap.
Since lim(T..... 00) yeT) = Dt/-P2 (recall that in the estimation P2 is always negative), the term Dij/-P2 is the
steady state (log) income gap. If the two countries have identical values for the Z variables, then Dij
=0 and the two countries will eventually reach the same level of steady state income. However, if one
country has poorer growth-related policies, then Dij will be negative and the country will never close
the income gap with the reference country above Dij/-P2' For example, we calculate that with current
policies Poland's steady state percent income gap vis-a-vis the European Union is 68 percent.
Therefore without policy changes its income will rise no higher than 68 percent of the EU average.
We also use this equation to calculate the time it takes a poorer country, (country j), to close
the income gap with a richer country (country i). This calculation can be performed with different
values of the Z variables, different parameter estimates, and different values of the initial income gap
and the desired income gap. We simply solve the equation above for T given targets for yeT), known
values of yeO) and the Z's, and regression estimates of the Ws. The solution for T is the following:
Alternative values for T, corresponding to different targets yeT) and different Dij 's are displayed in
table 14.
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1. The data were purchased from Political Risk Services, a political-risk assessment fIrm.
2. There are, in fact, linkages between a worker's contribution and future retirement benefIts, since the benefIts
are linked to years of contributions, as well as to the wage levels prior to retirement. The linkages, however, tend to
be complex and not especially tight. Workers tend to view their retirement benefIts are largely independent of their
individual payroll tax payments (see Auerbach, 1995, for a further discussion of this issue).
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